pp. 2732-2744 | Article Number: iejme.2016.226
Published Online: September 05, 2016
Article Views: 144 | Article Download: 200
The urgency of the analyzed issue is due to the importance of the use of economic-mathematical tools in the course of modeling the interaction of the entities in the customs service system that is necessary for the development of foreign economic activity (FEA) of any state. The purpose of the article is to identify effective strategies for the interaction between the participants of foreign trade activities with customs brokers. The leading method to the study of this issue is economic-mathematical modeling, allowing studying the process of making decisions while choosing the strategy of cooperation between the customs broker and his client. Results: the article suggests the mathematical model to optimize the management mechanisms of interaction between enterprises, engaged in foreign trade, and customs dealers. The data of this article may be useful in modeling interaction of the entities in the customs service system using the methods of game theory. The model of “customer - customs broker” is implemented as a bimatrix game. Assuming the noncooperativegame the authors solve the problem of finding Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; the customs service system; international economic activity; the game approach to economic modeling
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