International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education

Nash Equilibrium Design in the Interaction Model of Entities in the Customs Service System
  • Article Type: Research Article
  • International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, 2016 - Volume 11 Issue 7, pp. 2732-2744
  • Published Online: 05 Sep 2016
  • Article Views: 523 | Article Download: 550
  • Open Access Full Text (PDF)
AMA 10th edition
In-text citation: (1), (2), (3), etc.
Reference: Fedorenko RV, Zaychikova NA, Abramov DV, Vlasova OI. Nash Equilibrium Design in the Interaction Model of Entities in the Customs Service System. Int Elect J Math Ed. 2016;11(7), 2732-2744.
APA 6th edition
In-text citation: (Fedorenko et al., 2016)
Reference: Fedorenko, R. V., Zaychikova, N. A., Abramov, D. V., & Vlasova, O. I. (2016). Nash Equilibrium Design in the Interaction Model of Entities in the Customs Service System. International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, 11(7), 2732-2744.
Chicago
In-text citation: (Fedorenko et al., 2016)
Reference: Fedorenko, Roman V., Nadezhda A. Zaychikova, Dmitiy V. Abramov, and Olga I. Vlasova. "Nash Equilibrium Design in the Interaction Model of Entities in the Customs Service System". International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education 2016 11 no. 7 (2016): 2732-2744.
Harvard
In-text citation: (Fedorenko et al., 2016)
Reference: Fedorenko, R. V., Zaychikova, N. A., Abramov, D. V., and Vlasova, O. I. (2016). Nash Equilibrium Design in the Interaction Model of Entities in the Customs Service System. International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, 11(7), pp. 2732-2744.
MLA
In-text citation: (Fedorenko et al., 2016)
Reference: Fedorenko, Roman V. et al. "Nash Equilibrium Design in the Interaction Model of Entities in the Customs Service System". International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education, vol. 11, no. 7, 2016, pp. 2732-2744.
Vancouver
In-text citation: (1), (2), (3), etc.
Reference: Fedorenko RV, Zaychikova NA, Abramov DV, Vlasova OI. Nash Equilibrium Design in the Interaction Model of Entities in the Customs Service System. Int Elect J Math Ed. 2016;11(7):2732-44.

Abstract

The urgency of the analyzed issue is due to the importance of the use of economic-mathematical tools in the course of modeling the interaction of the entities in the customs service system that is necessary for the development of foreign economic activity (FEA) of any state. The purpose of the article is to identify effective strategies for the interaction between the participants of foreign trade activities with customs brokers. The leading method to the study of this issue is economic-mathematical modeling, allowing studying the process of making decisions while choosing the strategy of cooperation between the customs broker and his client. Results: the article suggests the mathematical model to optimize the management mechanisms of interaction between enterprises, engaged in foreign trade, and customs dealers. The data of this article may be useful in modeling interaction of the entities in the customs service system using the methods of game theory. The model of “customer - customs broker” is implemented as a bimatrix game. Assuming the noncooperativegame the authors solve the problem of finding Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

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License

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.